

SAGT 2024

17th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory

Scientific Program

CWI, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
September 3–6, 2024

Welcome to SAGT 2024!

On behalf of the Organizing Committee, we are delighted to welcome you to the *17th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2024)*, held at Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica (CWI) in Amsterdam, September 3–6, 2024.

SAGT 2024 received a record number of 84 submissions and the Program Committee faced the difficult task of selecting 32 papers for presentation at the conference (resulting in an acceptance rate of 38%). The scientific program also includes invited talks by three distinguished researchers: Paul Duetting (Google Research, Switzerland), Vasilis Gkatzelis (Drexel University, United States) and Katrina Ligett (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel). Additionally, SAGT 2024 hosts a Tutorial Day featuring two tutorials given by Jan Maly (WU Wien, Austria) and Rebecca Reiffenhäuser (University of Amsterdam, Netherlands). SAGT 2024 also includes a LightNLing Talks session, providing junior researchers from the Netherlands an opportunity to present their work.

The Program Committee selected two papers to receive Best Paper Awards, funded by Springer: Farid Arthaud receives the Best Student Paper Award for his paper "Playing Repeated Games with Sublinear Randomness" and Rashida Hakim, Jason Milionis, Christos Papadimitriou and Georgios Piliouras receive the Best Paper Award for their paper "Swim Till You Sink: Computing the Limit of a Game".

For social activities, we have planned a casual reception with light bites and beverages at the end of the Tutorial Day, as well as a conference reception featuring traditional Dutch appetizers and drinks at the end of the first Conference Day (Wednesday). The SAGT 2024 Conference Dinner will be held on Thursday evening at the delightful restaurant Baut Oost. To reach the venue, we will embark on a boat trip through the beautiful canals of Amsterdam.

The organization of SAGT 2024 would have been impossible without the generous financial support of our Gold Sponsors G-Research and IOG, as well as AIJ, CWI, Google, ILLC, Springer, Networks, NWO, and VVSOR Operations Research. Thanks to the generous support of G-Research, we were able to offer travel grants to students to attend SAGT 2024. Additionally, a grant from NWO enabled us to waive registration fees for a limited number of junior researchers from the Netherlands to attend and present their research.

Many individuals contributed to the organization of SAGT 2024. We would like to thank the 35 members of the PC and the external reviewers for their excellent work in evaluating the submissions. Our gratitude also goes to the local organizers, Susanne van Dam, Ulle Endriss, Sophie Klumper and Artem Tsikiridis, and several people from ITF and COM at CWI, for their invaluable assistance in organizing the conference.

We very much hope that you will enjoy SAGT 2024 and your stay in Amsterdam.

Guido Schäfer and Carmine Ventre
SAGT 2024 PC Co-Chairs

SAGT 2024 Gold Sponsors

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

Conference Venue

SAGT 2024 takes place at Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica (CWI), Science Park 123, 1098 XG Amsterdam. CWI is situated in the Amsterdam Science Park area (see back cover for a map). *All sessions of the conference are held in the **Turing room** (congress hall next to CWI).*

Reaching CWI

CWI can be reached conveniently by public transport. Google Maps or http://9292.nl/en can be used to plan your journey.

The nearest train station is Amsterdam Science Park (about 6–10 minutes walk). There are four trains per hour from/to Amsterdam Central Station. The departure times from Amsterdam Central Station to Science Park are x:10, x:23, x:41, x:53 (directions Amersfoort Vathorst or Almere Oostvaders). The departure times from Amsterdam Science Park to Central Station are x:10, x:29, x:40, x:59 (directions Hoofddorp or Leiden Centraal). The train ride takes 8–10 minutes (2 stops).

The other nearby train stations are Amsterdam Amstel and Amsterdam Muiderpoort. From Amsterdam Amstel (close to Hotel Casa) you can take bus 40 (towards Muiderpoort Station) and get off at Science Park Aer. From Amsterdam Muiderpoort you can take bus 40 (towards Amstel Station) and get off at Science Park Amsterdam.

Registration Desk, WiFi Access and Conference Proceedings

The registration desk is located next to the conference room. If you need help for any specific issues during the conference, please approach the staff at the registration desk, or get in touch with Susanne van Dam.

CWI provides the *eduroam* wireless network that should be accessible by all conference participants. But please be aware that it is not available in the Turing room.

Free access to the online proceedings of SAGT 2024 will be granted until 15 October 2024 via the following link: https://link.springer.com/book/9783031710322.

Speaker Presentations

Speakers are kindly requested to be in the Turing room at least 10 minutes before their session begins to check their presentations. We strongly encourage you to upload your presentation in advance using the following link: http://www.cwi.nl/upload (pdf or pptx). Even if you plan to use your own laptop for the presentation, having a backup on our system is always a good idea. Please use the following naming convention when uploading your file:

`SAGT2024-S[session number]-[talk number].{pdf|pptx}`

If you are using your own laptop, kindly ensure that all equipment is properly set up and functioning beforehand to allow for a smooth transition between talks.

SAGT 2024 Best Paper Awards

We are excited that SAGT 2024 offers two Best Paper Awards. Both papers will be presented on Thursday, 11:30–12:50 (Session 4).

Best Paper Award: "Swim Till You Sink: Computing the Limit of a Game" by Rashida Hakim, Jason Milionis, Christos Papadimitriou and Georgios Piliouras.

Best Student Paper Award: "Playing Repeated Games with Sublinear Randomness" by Farid Arthaud.

Reception, Lunches and Business Meeting

We will have a casual reception at the end of the Tutorial Day (Tuesday) at 17:30 at CWI. Some light bites and beverages will be served. Feel free to join! The conference reception will be on Wednesday evening at 17:30, immediately following the business meeting. Some traditional Dutch appetizers and drinks will be served. Please join!

All lunches will be served onsite. There will be an Indonesian lunch on Wednesday and a Mediterranean lunch on Thursday.

The business meeting is planned on Wednesday evening at 17:00 (Turing room), immediately following the last session of the day.

SAGT 2024 Conference Dinner & Boat Trip

The SAGT 2024 Conference Dinner takes place at the delightful restaurant Baut Oost (don't miss it!). The address of the restaurant is Wibautstraat 125, 1091 GL Amsterdam.

We have organized a boat trip to the restaurant, offering a tour through the beautiful canals of Amsterdam. The **boat departs at 17:45 from Amsterdam Central Station**: pick-up is at Prins Hendrikkade 37a, 1012 TM Amsterdam (exit Amsterdam Central Station at the front and follow the directions on the map). Please ensure you arrive on time, as the boat will not wait!

IMPORTANT: Please bring your ticket for the conference dinner indicating your menu choices (backside of your badge). This is important to facilitate the service at the restaurant!

Code of Conduct

In an effort to combat bullying, discrimination, and harassment, SAGT 2024 endorses the code of conduct outlined in Appendix D of the Report from the Ad hoc committee to Combat Harassment and Discrimination in the Theory of Computing Community.

9:00–10:00	Registration & Coffee/Tea Chair: Guido Schäfer
10:00–11:00	**Tutorial by Jan Maly** *Proportionality in Multi-Winner Voting: Axioms, Voting Rules and Equilibria*
11:00–11:30	Coffee/Tea Chair: Guido Schäfer
11:30–12:30	**Tutorial by Jan Maly** *Proportionality in Multi-Winner Voting: Axioms, Voting Rules and Equilibria*
12:30–13:30	Lunch Chair: Carmine Ventre
13:30–14:30	**Tutorial by Rebecca Reiffenhäuser** *Prophet Inequalities with Limited Information*
14:30–15:00	Coffee/Tea Chair: Carmine Ventre
15:00–16:00	**Tutorial by Rebecca Reiffenhäuser** *Prophet Inequalities with Limited Information*
16:00–16:30	Coffee/Tea Chair: Guido Schäfer
16:30–17:30	**LightNLing Talks** 1. *An Improved Bound for the Price of Anarchy for Related Machine Scheduling* by Arman Rouhani 2. *Fair Division with Minimal Withheld Information in Social Networks* by Ivan Bliznets 3. *Distributionally Robust Monopoly Pricing: Switching from Low to High Prices in Volatile Markets* by Tim van Eck 4. *The Secretary Problem with Independent Sampling* by Tim Oosterwijk
17:30–19:00	Casual Reception (light bites and beverages)

Jan Maly, Vienna University of Economics and Business & TU Wien

Proportionality in Multi-Winner Voting: Axioms, Voting Rules and Equilibria

Abstract: Voting is one of the oldest and most studied forms of collective decision making. In this tutorial, I will focus on a specific form of voting, namely multi-winner voting, where a set of voters must elect a committee of k candidates out of a larger set of available alternatives. One of the central requirements in multi-winner voting is that the chosen committee represents the electorate's preferences in a proportional manner. While proportionality is well understood in traditional parliamentary elections, it is not immediately clear what it means without a rigid party structure. However, recent advances in computational social choice theory have allowed us to develop a new and deeper understanding of fairness and proportionality in multi-winner voting, even without explicitly defined parties.

In the first part of the tutorial I will give an introduction to this recent literature on proportionality in multi-winner voting, presenting some axioms that have developed to formally capture the intuitive idea of proportionality, examine some voting rules designed to provide proportional committees, and look at some computational aspects of finding fair committees. In the second part of the tutorial, I will link multi-winner voting with game theory by showing that many of the axioms and rules touched on in the first part can be understood in terms of equilibria in normal-form games or in markets for public goods. To conclude, I will discuss important open questions in multi-winner voting and how methods from (algorithmic) game theory might be used to answer them.

Homepage: https://janmaly.de/

Rebecca Reiffenhäuser, University of Amsterdam

Prophet Inequalities with Limited Information

Abstract: Many applications require assigning resources in an online fashion: decisions on incoming bids have to be made immediately, and before seeing all n bids in the sequence. A fundamental hardness inherent to this setting limits online strategies to perform no better than the one that simply picks a random winner for each good, so additional assumptions are needed. Famously, in prophet inequalities, one assumes access to all n (independent) distributions that the participants bids will be drawn from, achieving exp. competitive guarantees of up to half the expected offline optimum.

Recently, considerable interest has been drawn to the fact that full prior distributional knowledge is in general not actually necessary to circumvent the impossibility. Instead, one can often achieve similar (or even equally good) approximations with access to just a few samples from each distribution. This data-driven approach poses a clear advantage in practical settings, where full distributions are rarely available (but one might, for example, know the bids the same participant placed in a few previous auctions).

The tutorial gives an overview of such results, with a focus on the edge case of 'minimal' prior knowledge, i.e. the online algorithm only has access to one single sample from each distribution. We first derive how and why constant ratios can be obtained for simple settings, and then show how the same principle surprisingly generalizes up to very recent results on XOS combinatorial assignments. Then, we consider the design of truthful mechanisms, a central goal whenever agents might bid strategically, and discuss the existing results as well as known obstacles to extending them.

Homepage: https://www.illc.uva.nl/People/person/5420/Dr-Rebecca-Reiffenhauser

Katrina Ligett, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Actually, Data is a Rival Good

Abstract: There is a tendency in many fields, including computer science, economics, and industry, to model data as a non-rival good, meaning that one entity using a particular piece of data doesn't impinge on its use by others. Food is a classic rival good (if I eat the apple, you cannot); digital music is a classic non-rival good (my listening to the song has no effect on your listening experience). Data might, at first blush, seem more like digital music than like an apple. In this talk, I will give arguments from three fields—economics, privacy, and statistics—for why modeling data as non-rival is problematic, and will argue that we need a new paradigm.

The core of the economic argument is that generative AI has transformed the market for data, making competition (and rivalrousness) for and around data newly central. The privacy and statistical validity arguments rely on mathematical frameworks that help us understand how repeated uses of a dataset accumulate and interact. All of these arguments suggest new models and metaphors for data, and directions for further work.

Homepage: https://www.cs.huji.ac.il/~katrina

9:00–10:00	Registration & Coffee/Tea
10:00–10:10	Opening Chair: Carmine Ventre
10:10–11:10	**Katrina Ligett** *Actually, Data is a Rival Good*
11:10–11:40	Coffee/Tea Chair: Rebecca Reiffenhäuser
11:40–13:00	**Session 1: Matching** 1. *Ex-post Stability under Two-Sided Matching: Complexity and Characterization* by Haris Aziz, Peter Biro, Gergely Csáji and Ali Pourmiri 2. *Structural and Algorithmic Results for Stable Cycles and Partitions in the Roommates Problem* by Frederik Glitzner and David Manlove 3. *The Team Order Problem: Maximizing the Probability of Matching Being Large Enough* by Haris Aziz, Jiarui Gan, Grzegorz Lisowski and Ali Pourmiri 4. **Online Matching with High Probability* by Milena Mihail and Thorben Tröbst
13:00–14:00	Lunch Chair: Ulle Endriss
14:00–15:20	**Session 2: Fair Division and Resource Allocation** 1. *Fair Division of Chores with Budget Constraints* by Edith Elkind, Ayumi Igarashi and Nicholas Teh 2. *Fair Division with Interdependent Values* by Georgios Birmpas, Tomer Ezra, Stefano Leonardi and Matteo Russo 3. *Fair Division with Bounded Sharing* by Samuel Bismuth, Ivan Bliznets and Erel Segal-Halevi 4. *Incentives in Dominant Resource Fair Allocation under Dynamic Demands* by Rachit Agarwal, Giannis Fikioris and Eva Tardos
15:20–15:40	Coffee/Tea Chair: Kira Goldner
15:40–17:00	**Session 3: Mechanism Design** 1. *Agent-Constrained Truthful Facility Location Games* by Argyrios Deligkas, Mohammad Lotfi and Alexandros Voudouris 2. *The k-Facility Location Problem Via Optimal Transport: A Bayesian Study of the Percentile Mechanisms* by Gennaro Auricchio and Jie Zhang 3. *Discrete Single-Parameter Optimal Auction Design* by Yiannis Giannakopoulos and Johannes Hahn 4. *Estimating the Expected Social Welfare and Cost of Random Serial Dictatorship* by Ioannis Caragiannis and Sebastian Homrighausen
17:00–17:30	Business Meeting
17:30–19:00	Conference Reception (Dutch appetizers and drinks)

Vasilis Gkatzelis, Drexel University

Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design

Abstract: For more than half a century, the dominant approach for the mathematical analysis of algorithms in computer science has been worst-case analysis. While worst-case analysis provides a useful signal regarding the robustness of an algorithm, it can be overly pessimistic, and it often leads to uninformative bounds or impossibility results that may not reflect real-world obstacles. Meanwhile, advances in machine learning have led to very practical algorithms, most of which do not provide any non-trivial worst-case performance guarantees. Motivated by the tension between worst-case analysis and machine learning, a surge of recent work focuses on the design of algorithms that are guided by machine-learned predictions, aiming to perform better in practice, while maintaining their robustness. Specifically, the goal of this literature on "learning-augmented algorithms" is to design algorithms that simultaneously provide two types of guarantees: "robustness" (which corresponds to the classic worst-case guarantees, even if the predictions that the algorithm is provided with are arbitrarily bad) and "consistency" (i.e., stronger performance guarantees when the predictions are accurate). This "learning-augmented framework" has been used successfully in a variety of settings, e.g., toward a refined analysis of competitive ratios in online algorithms and running times in traditional algorithms.

A recent line of work on "learning-augmented mechanism design" has deployed this learning-augmented framework in settings involving strategic agents. In such settings, the designer often faces additional obstacles which further limit their ability to reach desired outcomes. For example, some of the input that the designer needs may be private information held by the participating agents, and the agents could strategically misreport this information, aiming to maximize their own utility. In other settings, the agents may even have direct control over some aspects of the outcome. The long literature on mechanism design has proposed a variety of solutions for these types of problems, aiming to align the incentives of the agents with those of the designer, but the worst-case guarantees of these solutions are often underwhelming from a practical perspective. This talk will introduce the "learning-augmented mechanism design" model and provide an overview of some of the results in this line of work.

Homepage: https://www.cs.drexel.edu/~vg399

09:30–10:00 Registration & Coffee/Tea

Chair: Guido Schäfer

10:00–11:00 **Vasilis Gkatzelis**

Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design

11:00–11:30 Coffee/Tea

Chair: Guido Schäfer & Carmine Ventre

11:30–12:50 **Session 4: Game Theory and Repeated Games**

Best Paper Awards

1. ***Best Paper:*** *Swim Till You Sink: Computing the Limit of a Game* by Rashida Hakim, Jason Milionis, Christos Papadimitriou and Georgios Piliouras
2. ***Best Student Paper:*** *Playing Repeated Games with Sublinear Randomness* by Farid Arthaud

3. *Edge-Dominance Games on Graphs* by Farid Arthaud, Edan Orzech and Martin Rinard
4. * *The Investment Management Game: Extending the Scope of the Notion of Core* by Vijay Vazirani

12:50–13:50 Lunch

Chair: Marc Uetz

13:50–15:10 **Session 5: Pricing, Revenue, and Regulation**

1. *Mind the Revenue Gap: On the Performance of Approximation Mechanisms under Budget Constraints* by Ahuva Mualem and Juan Carlos Carbajal
2. *Sublogarithmic Approximation for Tollbooth Pricing on a Cactus* by Andrzej Turko and Jarosław Byrka
3. *To Regulate or Not to Regulate: Using Revenue Maximization Tools to Maximize Consumer Utility* by Meryem Essaidi, Kira Goldner and S. Matthew Weinberg
4. *Balancing Participation and Decentralization in Proof-of-Stake Cryptocurrencies* by Aggelos Kiayias, Elias Koutsoupias, Francisco Marmolejo-Cossío and Akaterini-Panagiota Stouka

15:10–15:30 Coffee/Tea

Chair: Pieter Kleer

15:30–16:50 **Session 6: Matroid Theory in Game Theory**

1. *Price of Anarchy in Paving Matroid Congestion Games* by Bainian Hao and Carla Michini
2. *Price of Anarchy for Graphic Matroid Congestion Games* by Wouter Fokkema, Ruben Hoeksma and Marc Uetz
3. *Non-Adaptive Matroid Prophet Inequalities* by Shuchi Chawla, Kira Goldner, Anna Karlin and Benjamin Miller
4. *Matroid Bayesian Online Selection* by Ian DeHaan and Kanstantsin Pashkovich

17:45–19:15 Boat Tour

19:30–22:30 Conference Dinner at Restaurant Baut Oost

Paul Duetting, Google Zurich

Ambiguous Contracts

Abstract: Contract theory captures situations where two parties—a principal and an agent—can benefit from mutual cooperation. The prototypical situation is one in which the principal seeks to delegate the execution of a job to an agent. The agent can take different costly actions, and his choice of action entails a stochastic outcome (with attached reward) for the principal. The principal cannot directly observe the agent's choice of action but can influence the agent's decision through a contract that specifies outcome-contingent payments. Given a contract, the agent aims to maximize his expected payment minus cost. The goal of the principal is to maximize her expected utility given by expected reward minus payment, under the action chosen by the agent.

One feature of real-life contracts that is not captured (or explained) by this classic model is that practical contracts are often ambiguous. For example, the promotion guidelines of a university may require a candidate to demonstrate "research productivity and excellence." Similarly, a professional services contract may require that a provider exert "due diligence." This ambiguity may be due to an inability of the two parties to provide more precise specification. In contrast, we explore the deliberate infusion of ambiguity as a tool to enhance the principal's contracting power over the agent.

Towards this goal we propose an extension of the classic (hidden action) principal-agent model. In this model, an ambiguous contract consists of a set of classic contracts, which the agent evaluates by considering the minimum utility a given action yields against any contract in the support of the ambiguous contract. At the same time, we require that the principal's utility—under the action chosen by the agent—is the same for all contracts in the support of the ambiguous contract. We show that this expands the set of actions that the principal can implement, and that the principal's gain from using an ambiguous contract can be arbitrarily large. We further characterize the structure of optimal ambiguous contracts, showing that ambiguity drives optimal contracts towards simplicity. We also provide a characterization of ambiguity-proof classes of contracts, where the principal cannot gain by infusing ambiguity. Finally, we show that when the agent can engage in mixed actions, the advantages of ambiguous contracts disappear.

Homepage: https://www.paulduetting.com

09:30–10:00	Registration & Coffee/Tea
	Chair: Carmine Ventre
10:00–11:00	**Paul Duetting**
	Ambiguous Contracts
11:00–11:30	Coffee/Tea
	Chair: Nicole Immorlica
11:30–12:50	**Session 7: Information Sharing and Decision Making**
	1. *Calibrated Recommendations for Users with Decaying Attention* by Jon Kleinberg, Emily Ryu and Eva Tardos 2. *Matrix Rationalization via Partial Orders* by Agnes Totschnig, Rohit Vasishta and Adrian Vetta 3. *Approval-Based Committee Voting under Uncertainty* by Haris Aziz, Venkateswara Kagita, Baharak Rastegari and Mashbat Suzuki 4. * *Prediction-Sharing During Training and Inference* by Yotam Gafni, Ronen Gradwohl and Moshe Tennenholtz
12:50–13:50	Lunch
	Chair: Vangelis Markakis
13:50–15:10	**Session 8: Computational Complexity and Resource Allocation**
	1. *k-Times Bin-Packing and its Application to Fair Electricity Distribution* by Dinesh Kumar Baghel, Alex Ravsky and Erel Segal-Halevi 2. *The Computational Complexity of the Housing Market* by Edwin Lock, Zephyr Qiu and Alexander Teytelboym 3. *Condorcet Markets* by Stephane Airiau, Nicholas Kees Dupuis and Davide Grossi 4. *Complexity of Round-Robin Allocation with Potentially Noisy Queries* by Zihan Li, Pasin Manurangsi, Jonathan Scarlett and Warut Suksompong
15:10	Appeltaart & Slagroom

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- Railway station
- Bus stop
- P1 Car park
- Cycle parking / repair
- Conference-/meeting room
- Café-restaurant
- Sport accommodation
- Supermarket
- Information display
- To be developed
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- Parking carsharing / Charging stations

Parking: You can follow the signs to the right car park at Amsterdam Science Park. You may park at the public (paid) car parks P1 or P7. Each company or institute has its own rules with regard to visitors. Visitors are advised to contact the institute or company prior to their appointment for parking instructions.